The Catholic Lawyer
Volume 8
Number 4 Volume 8, Autumn 1962, Number 4

Article 5

The School Prayer Case: What Course for the Future - Part II
William B. Ball

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl
Part of the Religion Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

THE SCHOOL PRAYER CASE:
Part II

WHAT COURSE FOR THE FUTURE?t
WILLIAM B. BALL*

E NGEL V. VITALE'

is now being discussed as an issue rather than as a

decision which resolved an issue. The variety of resolutions to the
issue now being widely suggested testifies to much dissatisfaction with
the decision. While it is to be noted that this dissatisfaction is by no
means universal, it must at the same time be recognized that acceptance
of the decision upon the part of many has been based upon an understanding that the decision concerned merely official school prayers composed by government.
Considering the decision to be one of wider scope,2 there is perhaps
some profit to be derived from briefly examining courses now being
suggested whereby difficulties created by the decision may be resolved.
As has been noted, the principal difficulty concerns the requirement
that all forms of religious practice and religious indoctrination in the
public schools must now cease, these including all inculcations of Secular
Humanist values and principles.3
Overruling
One possible course would consist in an express overruling-at least
in part-of the decision. An implied overruling of the decision, considering the broad premises upon which Engel is constructed and which give
it its meaning, will prove difficult and could result in further confusion.
While disregard in this instance for the principle of stare decisis will
entail criticism of the Justices, there would also undoubtedly be a subt Part I of this article appeared in 8 CATHOLIC LAWYER 182 (1962).
* A.B. Western Reserve University; J.D., College of Law, University of Notre
Dame. Former Professor of Law, School of Law, Villanova University. Presently, Executive Director and General Counsel, Pennsylvania Catholic Welfare
Committee.
1370 U.S. 421 (1962).
2

See Part I of this article, 8 CATHOLIC LAWYER 182 (1962).

3 Id. at 191-96.
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stantial opposite reaction.4
What portions of the Engel decision
should be reached in such overruling? Undoubtedly, the peculiar doctrine of "suing
to stand" 5 expressed in the majority opinion
should be reached in most explicit fashion.
Going beyond the question of standing, if
a subsequent decision were to overrule
that
only so far -as
Engel so far -but
decision pertained to official prayers composed by government, such result would be
at total odds with the broad premises stated
in EngelG and would moreover obviously
result in further serious public difficulty.
If an overruling decision were to validate,
in effect, all "official praying," the abandonment of those premises would clearly
be required. The door would then appear
to have been opened to all manner of noncompulsory religious excercises and practices in the public schools. Certainly it
would not be logical to say that children
in public schools might constitutionally

4The warning of Justice Frankfurter is, of
course, to be noted: "Especially ought the Court
not reenforce needlessly the instabilities of our
day by giving fair ground for the belief that
Law is the expression of chance-for instance,
of unexpected changes in the Court's composition and the contingencies in the choice of

recite the Lord's Prayer but that they might
not constitutionally commemorate the
Lord's birth. Such a subsequent decision
would, in effect, restore the state of the law
to that existing immediately prior to Engel,
there remaining the reservation of the McCollum7 decision respecting formal, onthe-premises religious instruction. The
McCollum reservation raises, however,
considerable difficulty when close attention
is paid to the question of what constitutes
instruction. This difficulty is greatly compounded when concepts respecting "orthodoxies," derived from the Barnette8 case,
and "religion," derived from the Torcaso
case, are introduced. 10
If, however, the Court were to overrule
the Engel decision and restore the constitutional status quo ante of religious programs in the public schools, a twofold
limiting principle should be expressed: (1)
that the religious program should be one
which reflects a consensus1" in the district
from which the students are drawn (2)
that no coercion should be exerted upon
any person whose beliefs are contradicted
or offended by the program or who for any
other reason does not desire to participate.
Such a principle, upon its face, would seem
to avoid the dilemma to which the Court
has now brought us: that the educating

successors." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 86 (1950). Likewise, however, should

be weighed in the balance the observation of
Justice Reed in Smith v. Allwright, that "In
constitutional questions, where correction depends upon amendment and not upon legislative
action this Court throughout its history has
freely exercised its power to reexamine the basis
of its constitutional decisions." 321 U.S. 649,
665 (1944).
5 For critical comment see Part I of this article,
supra note 2, at 189-91.
6 See discussion, id. at 184. Particularly in Supreme Court decisions upon constitutional questions must the decisional premises be considered
inseparable from the practical decisional result.

Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203 (1948).
8 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
7

319 U.S. 624 (1943).

9Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
10 This subject is briefly discussed in 8 CATrIOLIC LAWYER 182, 191-96 (1962).
1" Not necessarily unanimity. It should also be
recalled that majorities as well as minorities are
made up of individuals, and the mandate of the
first amendment is violated when an individual
is coerced in belief or practice regardless of
whether he belongs to a minority or to the
majority.

8
process necessarily involves orthodoxies
but that the Constitution necessarily excludes orthodoxies. Scope would appear to
be given to majority beliefs while protection would be afforded to minority rights.
In further support of such a principle it
could be argued that there is no essential
evil - philosophic or otherwise - in majorities and majority views. Some comments
favoring Engel have come near to expressing an assumption that majority theistic
beliefs are actually synonymous with impositions. But it is undeniably important,
in a democratic society, that scope not be
unreasonably
denied
the expression,
through public institutions, of majority beliefs. Doubtless it is also important that
a court, when entertaining a challenge to
the constitutionality of a "values" program
in the schools, most carefully regard the
fact of a public consensus supporting such
program, just as it is entirely improper that
a court should manifest a compulsion to
disregard such consensus, especially upon
the basis of the assertion by a few that
such program offends them only derivatively-i.e., through offending the Constitution.
So far as the principle concerns coercion,
there would be some logic in scrapping the
strained view of coercion (or "injury")
which apparently obtained in McCollun. '
Certainly, as Justice Jackson in that case
suggested, legal compulsion should be required to be shown rather than mere subjective embarrassment attendant upon a
decision not to participate in a program.'12

Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,

supra note 7, at 233.
11

Such embarrassment was not found in Zorach

v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). As Professor
Kauper has perceptively noted, there appeared
no difference, so far as coercive element is concerned, between the situations with which each
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The principle, however simple in statement, may involve much difficulty in practical application due to its requirement of
a consensus. The Court, it should be noted,
has utilized the concept of a consensus in
first amendment cases - notably with respect to the determination, in criminal
cases, of what constitutes obscenity. 14 Here
guilt or innocence will turn upon the question of "whether to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."'" Little comment has thus far appeared in the obscenity cases respecting
how the "community standard" is determined. 1 Assuming that a school district
might be designated as the geographical
area in which it would be sought to ascertain whether a consensus existed, the difficulty would at once be encountered that
in many district it would be obvious that
no consensus - in the sense that an overwhelming majority belonged to a single
sect - existed. And it would need to be
recalled that, whereas in some communities
a consensual common core of religious
expression has been arrived at through
interfaith negotiation, in other communities this has proved impossible, due often
to the vigorous efforts of believers in Secular Humanism who insist, not that the
public schools shall be neutral (i.e., giving
some scope to the religious aspirations of
all) but that they shall be promoters of
Secular Humanist sectarianism.

decision dealt. KAUPER, FRONTIERS

OF CONSTI-

120-25 (1956).
14 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
I5 at 489.
Id.
TUTIONAL LIBERTY,

",Or

indeed what geographical subdivision may
be said to constitute the "community" in a particular case.
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The consensus principle poses other
serious difficulties. A most exacting test of
community sentiment would be required.
In view of the mobility of population in
the United States today, frequent retesting of such sentiment would be needed in
many areas. An ultimate effect of orienting
the schools according to a community consensus might also be the retarding of population movement, due to the fact that, for
example, a family might not desire to move
into a particular community where a given
theistic or nontheistic program of valueexpression was offered in that community's
public schools. This would be a problem of
particular significance if most churchrelated schools in the United States were
forced by economic pressure to close.
Again, the technique for ascertainment
of such sentiment would not be easy to define, and a special obstacle is encountered
in the fact that ascertainment would have
to be made not merely of the rather readily
definable views of Catholics, Lutherans,
Orthodox Jews and other theistic religious
groups, but also of expressions of nontheistic belief. In contemporary America,
where there is a widespread lack of an
awareness of philosophy, this becomes a
formidable obstacle indeed.
Amendment
It is being urged that, since the Court
has now declared that the no establishment
clause requires that no official religious exercises or practices exist in the public
schools, the Constitution should be
amended. The plea for amendment rests,
in part, upon the assumption that the
Engel decision ousts only theistic religion
from the public schools. Thus, of necessity,
it helps divert attention from the dilemma
(described in the first part of this article)

at which the Court in Engle has arrived.
In view of that dilemma, it might seem
somewhat extravagant to seek resolution
through a fundamental exertion of the
whole people when judicial means (already
discussed herein) might provide a solution
of some utility.
In the event that an amendment is sought,
serious questions are presented as to what
it should provide. Clearly, amendment
merely making provision for official prayers would be inadequate."
Unaffected
then would be the larger, more significant
area of the role of religion in the public
life of the nation. An amendment simultaneously reflecting the real intent of the
framers of the first amendment as well as
the undoubted consensus of the people today would prohibit, in terms, congressional
establishment of a state religion, give recognition to governmental accommodation
of religion in American life and ban governmental preferment of particular religions
or religious groups. 8 Undoubtedly any such
amendment would leave some questions
outstanding. If the term, "Congress", were
employed afresh in a redrfifting of the first
amendment, would this not signify the intent of the people that the revised first
amendment should not have application,
through the fourteenth amendment, to
states? If the term "Congress" were not
employed but instead it were stated that
A resolution proposed by Senator Glenn Beall
provides the following amendatory language:
"Nothing contained in this Constitution shall be
construed to prohibit the administrator of any
school, school system, or educational institution
supported in whole or in part from any public
funds from providing for the voluntary participation by the students thereof in regularly scheduled
periods of nonsectarian prayer." S.J. Res. 205,
87th Cong., 1962.
IS See Cusack, The Prayer Case-First Amendment Revision, appearing in this issue at p. 281.
17
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"neither the federal government nor any
state government shall make any law (etc.)
• then would such substituted language
place upon the states a duty to accommodate or encourage religion, if the revised
first amendment also contained language
providing for such accommodation or recognition? Further, if language providing
for accommodation or encouragement of
religion were employed, what would this
mean in view of the fact that the Court has
stated that nontheistic religions, such as
Secular Humanism, constitute "religion"
under the first amendment? 19 Doubtless
also, questions would be raised respecting
the meaning of an "accommodation" or
"encouragement" concept. It is believed,
however, that such questions would be resolved by an express limitation prohibting
preference to given religions or religious
groups. Settled beyond argument, for example, would be the question of the power
of government to provide chaplaincies for
the armed forces, as well as many another
practice appearing in Justice Douglas'
lengthy index of forbidden practices catalogued in his concurring opinion in Engel
v. Vitale.2"
A more substantial difficulty, however,
is posed by resort to amendment. Likely,
it would work harm to the Supreme Court
as an institution. It cannot be doubted that
the prestige of the Court would be seriously blighted through the adoption of an
amendment correcting its decision. The
amending process, if successful, would require the fullest use of political processes
in the fifty states,2 and in the political effort to achieve amendment a translation

19Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
20 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 437 (1962).
21 U.S. Const. art. V.

of the legal issues into a popular "peopleversus-Court" psychology would be inevitable. In answer to this it would doubtless
be said by many that the Justices, by virtue of Engel, had courted these consequences and perhaps even that an institution of nine men who pronounce the law
for 180 million citizens needs an occasional
reminder of the popular will. 22 Yet, upon
balance, amendment to correct Court action would appear to be undesirable policy
unless other alternatives were unavailable. With respect to the "religion in the
schools" question, other alternatives may
be possible in aid of achieving the objectives which amendatory action would
accomplish. One such alternative, as has
been herein noted, would be corrective action by the Court itself. Such action, however, would need to involve as its chief
feature an objective, balanced and historically accurate statement of the intendment
of the "religion" clauses of the first amendment, along with abandonment of the baseless position that one religion, namely, Secular Humanism, enjoys a preferred posiAmendment to correct Supreme Court action
was resorted to in the adoption of the eleventh
amendment (1795), to overcome the effect of
the Court's action in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793), whereby it accepted
jurisdiction of a suit against a state by a citizen
of another state. A prime motive for adoption of
the fourteenth amendment, in 1868, was the
decision of the Court in Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (the Dred Scott
Case), wherein the Court had held that Negroes
were ineligible to attain United States citizenship
either from a state or by virtue of birth in the
United States. Ratification of the sixteenth
amendment, in 1913, was the direct consequence
of the decision by the Court in 1895, whereby
the attempt of Congress to place a tax uniformly
upon incomes in the United States was held unconstitutional. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
22

Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
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tion in the American scheme. As has also
been noted, the result upon the public
schools of such corrective decision would
be to permit only such religion to be offered in the public schools of a district as
could be determined by mediative proc23
esses in the community in question.
Religion as Culture
24
Widely discussed in preceding years
has been the utilization of programs by public schools which acquaint pupils with religion as a part of general culture. As
stated by one study, such programs are to
be characterized by a

deliberate aim and definite plan to deal
directly and factually with religion wherever and whenever it is intrinsic to learning
experience in social studies, literature, art,
music, and other fields. The aims of such
study are to develop religious literacy, intelligent understanding of the role of religion in human affairs, and a sense of obligation to explore the resources that have been
found in religion for achieving durable convictions and personal commitments. These
aims arise from the requirements of general
education which, to be effective, must view
2
culture, human life and personality whole. 5
To many, the chief shortcoming of pro-

23 The quantum would also depend upon whether
the McCollum decision were affected by the sub-

grams of "teaching about" religion is that
they fail to satisfy the need to learn religious doctrine in detail and depth and to
give religion its place in the communal
life of the school through prayer and the
celebration of holy days. To others, undoubtedly, "teaching about" religion may
26
readily become a teaching of religion. It
is obvious that in references to religion, or
in the comparing of religions, a constant
attitude of neutrality will be impossible for
some teachers and difficult for many. More
difficult still will be the achieving of an
appearance of neutrality such as to satisfy
large numbers of pupils possessing strong
beliefs respecting religion. If "teaching
about" religion is to be chosen as the way
out of the problems posed by Engel, and as
the means for satisfying the widespread demand of the public for religion in the
schools, it may prove that a well-nigh intolerable burden of responsibility will have
been placed upon the shoulders of public
school teachers. For they will now need a
deep and accurate knowledge of a wide variety of religious beliefs, history and practices, along with consummate skill in presentation, in order that they may avoid both
the Scylla of indoctrination and the Charybdis of misstatement.
Conclusions

tional Education Association of the United States
and American Association of School Adminis-

(1) Should the Court overrule the Engel decision and then go on to state an interpretation of the first amendment which
expressly recognized that government may
accommodate or encourage religion, then
the public schools would be free to provide
religious programs. The principle of non-

trators) 77 (1951); THE FUNCTION OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL IN DEALING WITH RELIGION (Amer-

26 The McCollum decision declared unconstitu-

sequent revisionary decision of the Court here
contemplated.
24

See CHATro

AND

HALLIGAN,

THE

STORY

OF

THE SPRINGFIELD PLAN 72, 73 (1945); THAYER,
RELIGION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 184-91 (1947);
MORAL AND SPIRITUAL VALUES IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS (Educational Policies Commission, Na-

ican Council on Education) 11 (1953).
25
THE FUNCTION

OF THE PUBLIC

DEALING WITH RELIGION,

SCHOOL IN

supra note 24.

tional the practice of giving religious instruction
on public school premises. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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preference would, however, dictate that in
any district a consensus support such program. For most districts, this requirement
would necessarily result in religious programs of a very limited sort. Such a statement by the Court is both proper and desirable. But so far as the realization of religious education as a part of public education is concerned, it must be recognized
that such statement will have effects which,
while good, will be most limited.
(2) A constitutional amendment declaring official school prayers not prohibited
by the Constitution would be undesirable.
It would involve a gigantic labor to achieve
a very small result while leaving standing
the more sweeping prohibitions implicit in
Engel. The broader amendment discussed
herein supra at page 289 would seem desirable in the absence of the judicial revision described in the preceding paragraph.
Some areas of public life other than education would then be indisputably areas for
governmental accommodation or encouragement of religion upon a nonpreferential basis. So far as religion in education
is concerned, it is difficult to see how, by
such amendment, any greater scope for
religion in public education would be
achieved than is described in the preceding
paragraph. The place of religion in American public life would, however, be secured
in explicit constitutional provision.
(3) "Teaching about" religion should
be considered constitutionally permissible
at present, although serious constitutional
problems may be envisioned, under existing
Supreme Court decisions,, where "teaching
about" becomes "teaching of" religion.
While it is undeniable that the subject of
religion forms part of the domain of secular knowledge and therefore must be taught
as a part of secular knowledge, it is also

true that such "teaching about" religion is
no real substitute for the religious education which many persons desire.
(4) Under existing interpretations by
the Supreme Court of the first amendment,
government may not coerce a child to sub27
mit to any form of religious indoctrination
or the inculcation of ideological orthodoxies. 28 The compulsory attendance laws bind
all children. But, as has been earlier discussed in this series of articles, public education embraces nontheistic religious indoctrination and the inculcation of ideological orthodoxies. This is, however, abhorrent to the principles of nonpreference.
This is in no sense to argue that, therefore,
public schools must cease to be objects of
public support; it is rather to point out the
fact that they, too, must be regarded as a
species of sectarian29 school and that there
can be no selection by government of a
particular sectarian school as the sole object of its bounty. Upon the view, however,
that government may appropriate public
funds for the achievement of the proper
public end of educating the citizenry, government must accord the various educational institutions which responsibly carry
out citizen education equality of treatment.
Whereas a great practical benefit then redounds to the citizen by virtue of. his being economically free to select an educa(Continued on page 342)

Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
supra note 26. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
27

(1962).
2s West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
29 Clearly under existing decisions the concept of

'sectarian" does not depend upon the existence
of a church, or institution or religious body.
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U. S. 1 (1947).
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federal constitution." The Maryland court,
while maintaining jurisdiction of the case
so that injunctive relief could be given and
mandamus issue, allowed the legislature to
redraft the offending sections of the Maryland constitution. The extent of the role that
the judicial branch must play in reapportionment still remains to be seen. It is now
certain that both state and federal courts
must take a part in redressing discrimination where it exists. The wisdom of placing
the judiciary within the "political thicket"

can best be justified by the statement of
Mr. Justice Clark:

62 Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v.

63 Baker v. Carr, supra note 59, at 262 (Clark,

Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 180 A.2d 656 (1962).

J., concurring).
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(Continued)
progress in its first academic year of teaching and study. The Law School looks forward to its opportunity to assume leadership in Inter-American legal education in
order that the Rule of Law rather than the
Rule of Tyranny shall prevail throughout
the world. In this Commonwealth which
has both civil and common law traditions,
the Law School has the avowed intent to

forge closer relationships between the
Americas. This new school recognizes the
urgent demand for the training of competent, independent and aggressive leaders of
the bar to maintain and protect the public
weal in its own free society.
The Law School was organized and established to develop leaders who will dedicate themselves to the aforesaid tasks and
to perpetuate the Christian Doctrine and
Philosophy of the law.

FUTURE COURSE

all schools must be regarded as sectarian,
his tax contribution to education may not
be directed to the support of one, among
many kinds of institutions, which accomplish the common educational objective.

(Continued)
tional institution (whether theistic or
otherwise) which corresponds to his conscientious choice, it is also true that, where

It is well for this Court to practice selfrestraint and discipline in constitutional adjudication, but never in its history have
those principles received sanction where the
national rights of so many have been so
clearly infringed for so long a time. National respect for the courts is more enhanced through the forthright enforcement
of those rights rather than by rendering
them nugatory through the interposition of
63
subterfuges.

